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ANTITRUST
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Did Not
Violate Anti-trust Laws When It Entered an
Exclusive Agreement With Pharmacy
The United States District Court for the Western District of New York
held a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) did not violate per se
the Sherman Act when it entered into an exclusive pharmacy network,
and did not tortiously interfere with pharmacy's relationships with its
customers.
Plaintiff pharmacy entered into a contractual agreement with
defendant HMO. 2 Since neither party was able to cancel the contract
within thirty days of written notice, the HMO exercised its right to
terminate the contract and announced it3 would form an exclusive
pharmacy network with another pharmacy.
The plaintiff pharmacy filed a four-part claim, first alleging
defendant HMO violated the Sherman Act and the Donnelly Act.
Plaintiff also alleged the exclusive pharmacy network violated the rule
of reason, the HMO tortiously interfered with the pharmacy's
relationship with its customers, and the relationship between the HMO
and its new pharmacy network interfered with plaintiff pharmacy's
business relationship with the HMO. 5
Defendant HMO filed a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the four claims
filed by the plaintiff.6 The court dismissed the anti-trust claim under
the Sherman and Donnelly Acts because the plaintiff failed to prove a
concerted action existed between two or more persons, and
7
unreasonably restrained trade either per se or under the rule of reason.
To measure the rule of reason analysis for an anti-trust claim, the
court must determine if the plaintiff properly alleged an anti-trust
'Drug Emporium v. Blue Cross of Western New York, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9139, at *1 (W.D.N.Y June 28,2000).
2
See id at *2.
3
See id at *3
5See id
4

See id.
Drug Emporium, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9139, at *6.
7See id at *8.
6
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damage. 8 The plaintiff must prove the damage sustained had an
adverse effect on the market competition
as a whole, not just the
9
competition.
pharmacy's
plaintiff
The court held the plaintiffs anti-trust claims did not correctly
demonstrate the HMO's exclusive pharmacy agreement had exerted a
harmful effect on the market as a whole.' 0 The court stated the
pharmacy had offered no proof regarding the actual effect of the
exclusive pharmacy network on drugstores and consumers in western
New York."
12
The court also held the rule of reason did not apply.
Furthermore, the court held the other pharmacy groups
3 did not interfere
with plaintiff's business relationship with the HMO. Drug Emporium
v. Blue Cross of Western New York, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 9139
(WD.N.YJune 28, 2000).

Without an Inference of Injury to Competition
There Can Be No Claim Under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held plaintiff did not raise an inference of injury to competition and
therefore his claim under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act (Act) was
14
dismissed.
Plaintiff, a psychiatrist, had his own office as well as staff
privileges at Good Shepherd Hospital (Hospital) where he was
periodically on-call in the Hospital's emergency room.' 5 Plaintiff
was on-call at Hospital on January 20, 1998 when a patient arrived in

8

See id. at *13.

9

See id.

'°See id.
"Drug Emporium, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9139, at * 14.
' 23See id. at *3.
1 See id.

14Wagner v. Magellan Health Services, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8729, at *1
(E.D. Ill. June 20, 2000).
See id. at *2.
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emotional distress.' 6 After conferencing with the patient's primary care
physician, plaintiff physician admitted the patient to the Hospital."
The patient's out-of-network benefits provider was Magellan
Health Services, Inc. (Magellan).' 8 Magellan reviewed the patient's
case and determined the patient's hospital stay would not be certified
for payment.19 Plaintiff physician, a non-Magellan provider, refused to
discharge the patient believing the discharge would not be in the
patient's best interest. 20 Magellan contacted several persons, including
the director of psychiatry at the hospital, threatening to withdraw its
contract with Hospital because of plaintiff physician's refusal to
discharge the patient.21 Magellan also contacted the patient and the
unit clerk at Hospital to inform them of the denial of payment.2
Plaintiff physician subsequently contacted Magellan's regional
director to discuss the issue. 23 The regional medical director renewed
the threat of canceling Magellan's contract with Hospital, but informed
plaintiff physician he would discuss the issue with Magellan's CEO.21
On November 4, 1998, plaintiff physician was on-call in Hospital
emergency room when another emergency psychiatriac patient with
Magellan insurance arrived.25 Magellan informed a Hospital social
worker that any physician except plaintiff physician could treat the
patient. 26 Magellan then requested that patient be transferred to another
hospital, even though the attending physician had not authorized the
transfer; medical stability had not been established; and the transfer
request was against Hospital's by-laws. 27 Magellan would not budge
from its position that plaintiff physician could not treat its patients.

'67 See id at *3.

1 See id
"8See id
' 9 Wagner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8729, at *3.
20
See id
21
See id

"See id
2See
id.at *3.
24
Wagner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8729, at *3.
2'See id at *4.
26
See id
27
See id.
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forcing Hospital to28 eventually have another physician undertake the
care of the patient.
On November 23, 1998 when Magellan attempted to have another
of its patients transferred from Hospital and plaintiff physician's care,
Hospital's medical director intervened, and told Magellan the patient
could not be
moved without violating COBRA statutes and Hospital's
29
procedure.
Plaintiff physician filed suit against Magellan on December 17,
1999, claiming it violated antitrust laws.30 The trial court dismissed
plaintiff's antitrust claims with prejudice. 3 1 The court reasoned the
injuries alleged by plaintiff were not of the type intended to be
prevented by the antitrust laws. 32 The court found there had not been a
reduction of the output of care to incoming patients since qualified
physicians were attending to their medical needs. 33 The court noted
antitrust laws were enacted to protect competition and not
competitors. 34 Since plaintiff physician alleged only he as a competitor
was injured but there was no actual injury to market competition, the
court held his claim was not one upon which relief could be granted.35
The court, therefore, dismissed plaintiff physician's claim. 36 Wagner v.
Magellan Health Services, Inc., 2000 US.Dist LKYIS 8729 (E.D. ll.
June 20, 2000).

2

1See id.

21Wagner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8729, at *4.
3
See id. at *5.
3
See id.at *5-21, 24.
32
See
33

id. at *14.
See id. at *14-16.

34
35

Wagner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8729, at *16.

See id. at * 17.

36

See id. at *16-21.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Failure to Alleviate the Risk of Substantial Harm Was Not
Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held failure to alleviate the risk37of substantial harm was
not considered cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff prisoner was in his cell on October 17, 1996 when he
became
3111.3
Plaintiff and other prisoners made noises to alert prison
officers of plaintiffs symptoms, but they received no response."' The
following morning, plaintiff was taken to the infirmary, examined by
defendant physician, and found to have very high blood pressure. 4 ' He
was placed in a hard cell and treated with Procardia, a medication for
lowering blood pressure.4 ' Later that morning plaintiff was examined
by another physician who ordered him to be transferred to an outside
hospital, where he was diagnosed as having a cerebral vascular
hemorrhage.42 Plaintiff subsequently filed suit against three physicians
affiliated with the Correction Physician's Services, Inc. (CPS), the
Secretary of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections (Secretary), and Corrections Officers (Officers) alleging he
was denied reasonable43medical care, leading to his debilitating cerebral
vascular hemorrhage.
Plaintiff raised several claims including failure to provide medical
care to an inmate in serious condition, medical malpractice, corporate
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress.4 The court
contended the Secretary was too far removed from the alleged actions
to be a party to the suit; defendant officers lacked liability since they
were ignorant of plaintiffs condition; and CPS's policies regarding
37

Fox v. Horn, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 432 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21, 2000),
38See id at *6.
39
See id
40
See id
41
See id
42
Fox, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 432, at *6.
43

See id

4See id at *5.
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treatment of sick inmates were adequate. 45 The court found no
evidence to support a finding of cruel and unusual punishment, noting
the failure of officials in the prison to alleviate a significant risk to
plaintiff could not be construed as inflicting punishment. 46 The court,
however, denied a defendant physician's motion for summary
judgment, finding a reasonable jury could find he was aware of the
substantial risk of harm to plaintiff by his course of treatment. 47 Fox v.
Horn, No. 98-5279, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 432 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 21,
2000).

CONTRACT
Physician Can Be Sued For an Oral Contract Breach But a
Jury Must Decide Whether the Patient's Version Of the
Orally Agreed Upon Allocation Is True
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held a physician could be sued for
an oral contract breach.48 However, a jury had to decide if the
allocation of physician's responsibility, orally agreed upon by the
49
patient and the physician, was true according to the patient's version.
Patient agreed to have defendant physician, a general surgeon,
perform a laparoscopic cholecystectomy (removal of the gallbladder)."0
The physician was assisted by a medical student and a fourth-year
general surgery resident. 51 One of the connecting structures to the gall
bladder, the cystic duct, needed to be dissected. 52 The fourth-year
surgical resident accidentally clipped and dissected the common bile
duct instead of the cystic duct.53 This incident led to a great deal of
45
46See

id. at *14.
See id. at * 11.
47

Fox, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 432, at *11.
Dingle v. Belin, 358 Md. 354 (Md. Apr. 11, 2000).
49
48

See id.

0

" See id. at 357.
51
See id. at 358.
52
See id.
53

Belin, 358 Md., at 358.
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pain and discomfort for the patient and required extensive corrective
surgery at another hospital.54
The patient claimed she specifically requested defendant physician
remove her gall bladder.55 She alleged breach of contract and lack of
informed consent because she had insisted the physician perform the
actual cutting and removal of the gall bladder56 She kmew the hospital
was a university affiliated teaching institution; therefore, she requested
and received promises from the physician that he alone would perform
7 She further
the surgery and use a resident only when necessary.55S
surgery.
the
perform
to
stated she did not want a resident
Plaintiff patient filed a four-count claim stating negligence based
on the lack of informed consent, battery, negligence in the performance
of the surgery, and breach of contract.59 Both the battery and breach of
contract claims were dismissed, but the negligence charges were
submitted 60to the jury who returned verdicts in favor of defendant
physician.
The patient subsequently appealed the lower court's decision,
claiming the resident was allowed to cut and remove her gall bladder
without her knowledge or consent.6 ' Plaintiff further claimed she
would not have consented to the resident performing the surgery. She
asserted the physician was negligent in his duty by allowing the
resident to perform the surgery. 2 The physician refuted the patient's
claims, stating the operation required three participants."3 Furthermore,
defendant physician claimed if the patient had indicated such rigid
stipulations, then he would not have performed the procedure."
The court of appeals held the physician could be sued for an oral
contract breach. 65 The court reasoned a jury should decide if the
5See id
55See
id at 359.
56

1 See id
57

See id.

SsBelin, 358 Md., at 359.
59
60See

idat 358.
See idat 359.
See id.
62
See id
63Befin, 358 Md., at 359.
64 See id
65
See id at 354.
61
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allocation of the physician's responsibility, orally agreed upon between
the physician and the patient, was indeed true.6 6 Accordingly, the
decision of the trial court was reversed.67 Dingle i. Belin, 358 Md. 354
(Md.Apr. 11, 2000).

Managed Care Organization Did Not Breach Contract But Could
Be Held Liable For Negligence When It Failed to Act Reasonably
The Supreme Court of Illinois held defendant Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) was not liable for breach of contract since the
68
plaintiff was not a party to the contract she wanted to enforce.
However, the court held the HMO was liable for institutional
negligence because the HMO did not act as a reasonably careful
organization, and there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to the
69
physicians.
to
enrollees
of
HMO's assignment
When plaintiffs three-month old daughter became ill, she called
her physician as instructed by defendant HMO. 70 The plaintiff relayed
her child's symptoms to the physician who instructed her to give the
child castor oil.7 1 The next day her daughter's condition had not
improved, so plaintiff took her to an emergency room.72 The child was
subsequently admitted after being diagnosed 73as having bacterial
meningitis which later led to permanent disability.
Plaintiff filed a complaint against the HMO for both institutional
negligence and breach of contract, and against the physician for
negligence.74 The institutional negligence claim charged the HMO
with wrongfully assigning defendant physician as her daughter's
primary care physician, and negligently implementing procedures
66

See id.
See id.

67

68

Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, No. 86830, 2000 111. LEXIS 656, at * I
(Ill. June
69 12, 2000).
See id.
70
See id. at *3.
71
72

73
74

See id.
See id. at *4.

jones, 2000 Ill. LEXIS 656, at *4.

See id.
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call the physician for an appointment before obtaining
requiring her to 75
emergency care.
In institutional negligence cases the standard of care for a
professional organization is to act as a reasonably careful organization,
in this case to act as a reasonably careful HMO.7W The court, in
reversing the appellate court's ruling in favor of the HMO on the
negligence claims, held the doctrine of institutional negligence could be
applied to HMOs and genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether defendant HMO negligently assigned more enrollees to
defendant physician than he was able to serve. 77 The court, therefore,
portion of the case to the circuit court for further
remanded this
78
proceedings.
On the breach of contract claim, the defendant HMO argued
plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment because she was not a
party to the agreement. 79 The court agreed and held plaintiff parent
was not a party to the contract because the contract was between the
HMO and the department of Public Aid, with the plaintiff parent as
only a third party beneficiary of this contract.80 Jones v. Chicago HMO
Ltd. of Illinois,No. 86830, 2000 11l. LEXIS 656 (Ill. June 12, 2000).

DISCOVERY
Discovery Rule Is Available to Patient Who Remains
Reasonably Unaware of an Injury Due to the Fault or
Neglect of an Individual or Entity
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held the benefit of the discovery
rule should be available to plaintiff patient who was reasonably

75

See idat*5.
See id.at *24.
77See id at*31-37.
7s ones, 2000 III. LEXIS 656, at 42.
79
See id at *40.
SoSee id at *41.
76
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unaware the injury she sustained was due to the fault or neglect of an
identifiable individual or entity. 8 '
Patient underwent a surgical procedure to alleviate urinary
incontinence. 82 She alleged her post-operative treatment was poor,3
resulting in further deterioration of her health and total incontinence.
The plaintiff patient asserted the negligence of certain of her physicians
brought about the harmful result and she subsequently filed a claim
against them. 84 She charged the after-care urologist deviated from
accepted standard of care for treatment of post-operative infections by
failing to administer antibiotics in a timely fashion, thus causing
plaintiff to develop an abdominal abscess. 85 The urologist group asked
for summary judgment, claiming the statute of limitations had
expired.86
The urologists claimed the bright line rule for medical negligence
cases starts the statute of limitations running for all potentially
87
responsible parties when a patient knows she has been injured.
However, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned it would be
unjust to deny the patient benefit of the discovery rule.88 The court
held the patient exercised "reasonable diligence and intelligence" in
claiming the statute of89limitations had not run out on the after-care
physicians' negligence.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision
dismissing defendant's motion for summary judgment. 90 Gallagher v.
Burdette-Tomlin Memorial. Hosp., 163 N.J. 38 (N.J., Feb. 16, 2000).

8

Gallagher v. Burdette-Tomlin Memorial Hosp., 163 N.J. 3S (N.J., Feb. 16,

2000).82

See id. at 40.
See id.
84
See id.
83

85
36See

id.
See Gallagher,163 N.J., at 44.
"See id.at 42.
"8See id.
at 44.
89
See id.at 43.
90

See id. at 45.
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EMTALA
Claim Can Be Filed Under the Emergency Medical
Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA) When Hospital
Fails to Screen or Stabilize Patients' Injuries
The United States District Court of Puerto Rico held a jury should
decide if a hospital deviated9 from its standard medical practice in
treating the patient's injuries. 1
The patient was taken to the hospital after being involved in a car
accident. 92 She suffered multiple traumas, especially to her right leg.
After she was stabilized, the admitting physician ordered a staff
member who was not trained in casting procedures to put a posterior
splint on patient's right leg. 94 The staff physician failed to put the
required sheet wadding and staking with the cast, resulting in the
patient's leg being burned. 9 - The patient's husband then decided to
take his wife to another hospital.9 After arriving at the other hospital,
the patient reported to the new physician hot fluid running along her
right leg.97 The cast was subsequently removed and it was noted that
the necessary casting undergarments had not been applied.)" The skin
on the patient's right leg was severely burned, and removal of the cast
caused total sloughing of the skin.99 Patient's right leg became
permanently disfigured; she lost significant movement; and ultimately
needed several skin graft operations. 00 The patient filed suit against
the hospital where she was first treated.'("

91

Sastre v. Hospital Doctor's Center Inc., 93 F.Supp. 2d 105 (D. Puerto Rico,
Mar 10, 2000).
92
93See id at 107.
See id
94
See id
See id

95

5Sastre, 93
97

F. Supp. 2d, at 107.

See id

93See id
99See id

'00See id
'0 Sastre, 93 F.Supp. 2d, at 107.
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To use an EMTALA claim, the patient has to prove the hospital
failed to follow the screening policy or standard of care they would
regularly follow for other patients with the same conditions.10 2 In order
to withstand the three prong test under EMTALA, the hospital must be
a participating hospital; the patient must come to the hospital seeking
treatment; and the hospital must refuse the patient care, discharge
her
03
improperly or transfer her without first stabilizing her condition. 1
Defendant hospital claimed the plaintiff patient had no cause
because she signed a waiver releasing herself and went to another
hospital.' 0 4 Furthermore, the defendant hospital also claimed the
patient's condition
was non-emergent and she was stable at
05
1
discharge.
The court disagreed with defendant hospital, stating the patient
had a claim under EMTALA and it was up to the jury to determine if
the hospital's actions, or in-actions, constituted a constructive
discharge.' 0 6 The court further determined the patient had a claim
under the 12 (b)(1) standard of the EMTALA claim.'0 7 Sastre v.
Hospital Doctor's Center Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D. Puerto Rico,
Mar 10, 2000).

EQUITABLE RELIEF
Preliminary Injunction Ordered For Physician Where No
Adequate Remedy Available and Potential Harm Irreparable
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania held a preliminary
injunction was appropriate where no adequate remedy 0was
available at
8
law for a physician who had suffered irreparable harm.1
'02See id. at 108.
'03See id. at 109.
04
" See id.
05
" See id. at 107.

'0 6Sastre, 93 F. Supp. 2d, at 111.
'07See id.
03
Carlini v. Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 2093 C.D., 1999, 2000 Pa.
Commw. LEXIS 350, at * 1 (June 26, 2000).
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Defendant Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield denied plaintiff
physician's re-credentialing application to the Keystone network based
on malpractice claims filed against him. 1 9 The decision was to be
communicated to the National Practitioners Data Bank %%,here health
care entities are required to report de-certifications
pursuant to the
I 0
Federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act. 1
On May 22, 1998, physician appellee commenced an equity action
alleging breach of contract, denial of due process, and unfair
competition. 111
Physician appellee petitioned for preliminary
injunction and requested re-certification, both of which the Chancellor
of the lower court ordered."12 Defendants Highmark and Keystone
appealed, concluding appellee did not have a clear right to relief under
state and federal statutes; Highmark and Keystone were not "state
actors"; and preliminary relief should not have been granted because an
adequate remedy was available at law.113
The Commonwealth Court found federal law draws the standards
for professional review proceedings by which physicians are entitled to
14
due process, and agreed with the Chancellor's holdings on that issue.1
The court also held a medical review committee was "a creature of the
l
state," and appellee's credentials were deserving of due process."1
Finally, the court held physician appellee's potential business loss
could not be reasonably measured, and physician was likely to lose
some patients. 1
The court reasoned no adequate remedy was
available at law, so there was no legal error in the Chancellor's decision
to enter a preliminary injunction and to order appellee reinstated." 7
The court accordingly affirmed the decision of the Common Pleas
Court of the County of Allegheny ordering appellee's reinstatement to

'See id

11°See id. at

*3-4.
"'See id. at 3.
" 32See id at *4.

" Carlini,2000 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 350, at *4-5
" 4See id at *6.

"See
id at *7.
116
See id. at *8.
?7See id
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the Keystone Network.11 8 Carliniv. Highmark Blue Cross Blue Shield,
No. 2093 C.D., 1999, 2000 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 350 (June26, 2000).

ERISA
ERISA Does Not Require HMOs
to Disclose Incentive Arrangements
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held Health
Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) were not required under the
Employment Retirement Insurance Security Act (ERISA) to disclose
financial incentive arrangements."19
Plaintiff ERISA plan member sued the HMOs under ERISA,
claiming defendant HMOs failed in their fiduciary duty by not
disclosing their financial incentive programs. 120 Defendants filed a
joint motion to dismiss. 12 1 The district court ruled in favor of the
FIMOs, finding they did not have23 to disclose financial incentive
arrangements.122 Plaintiff appealed. 1
The court of appeals agreed with the lower court, holding the
defendants did not have a duty to disclose since ERISA does not
contain a specific reference to disclosing information concerning
physician incentive programs. 124 Although plaintiff argued the duty
was implied in ERISA, the court held the canon of statutory
construction stated specific language trumped general language. 125 The
court further reasoned that since Congress did not specifically state
there was a duty to disclose physician incentive programs, then
Congress did not intend for it to be a part of ERISA. 126 Accordingly,
"'Carlini,2000 Pa. LEXIS 350, at *8
119Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Texas, No. 98-11020, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS
27 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2000).
0
12
See id. at *3.
121See id. at *4.
122See id.
123See id.
124Ehlmann, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27, at *4.
2

' 5See id. at *4.
126 See id.
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the court of appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court that HMOs
do not have a duty to disclose.127 Ehhnann v. Kaiser Found. Health
Plan of Texas, No. 98-11020, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 27 '5th Or. Jan.
4,2000).

FRAUD
Delivery of Services Which Falls Within the Appropriate
Standard of Care Is Not Considered Fraud
United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
Southern Division, held physicians' delivery of services that met the
required standard of care did not constitute fraud through false
28
billing.'
Plaintiff, a vascular technologist, filed a complaint on behalf of the
federal government contending defendant physicians defrauded the
government by not reviewing the video tape results of venous ultra
sound studies taken of patients suffering from Deep Venous
Thrombosis (DVT), and thus defendants falsely billed for services they
did not provide. 2 9 Defendants filed for summary judgment.
Plaintiff alleged defendant physicians could not have made a
correct billable "interpretation" with the information defendants had
according to the Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA)
Carriers Manual (Carrier Manual).' 3 ' Defendants contended IICFA's
Carrier Manual was neither the controlling law,, nor the appropriate
procedure for physicians.' 32 Defendants claimed the HCFA Provider
Handbook (Handbook) did not provide instructions on venous
ultrasound billing procedures. 3 3 In addition, defendants claimed the
falsity of claims should be judged according to guidelines for
127
2 See id.at *6.

1SUnited States ex rel. Swafford, No. 4:97-CV-1 16,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

2172, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Feb 18, 2000).
I29See id at *4.
" See id
"See
id at *S.
2
13
See id
133Swafford, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2172, at *S.
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reimbursement of the professional component of tests described in the
if
Handbook. 134 The Handbook stated services were reimbursed
"medically indicated and necessary for the health of the patient."1 35
Since there was a lack of specific billing guidelines regarding
venous ultrasounds, and the Carrier Manual did not dictate physicians
must review the videotapes of venous ultrasounds, the court found the
carrier manual 36 regulation was the controlling standard for
reimbursement.1
In granting summary judgment to the defendants, the court stated
the defendants complied with the existing regulations; therefore, their
claims could not be found false under HFCA. 13 7 United States ex rel.
Swafford, No. 4:97-CV-116, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2172, (W.D. Mich.
Feb 18, 2000).

NEGLIGENCE
A Blood Bank Is Not Considered a Health Care Provider
and Expert Medical Testimony During Discovery Is Not
Necessary to Establish Liability
The Supreme Court of Delaware held a blood bank is not a professional
health care provider and its liability could be established without expert
testimony during discovery, 38which proved its failure to follow the
appropriate standard of care.1
The deceased contracted the Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) through a blood transfusion during his treatment for acute
anemia at Wilmington Medical Center. 139 The blood used in the
transfusion was obtained from defendant Blood Bank of Delaware
(Blood Bank) and was contaminated with HIV. 140 The decedent's
34

' See id. at *8.

135See id.
136See id.
137See id. at *11.

138Blood Bank of Delaware v. Price, No. 133, 2000 Del. LEXIS 81 (Del. Feb.
28, 2000).
139See id. at *2.
40
1 See id.
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widow and estate claimed Blood Bank was negligent in its failure to
warn decedent of his risk of contracting HIV; failure to screen donors
for IV;
and its failure to implement procedures for screening
4'
donors.1
Blood Bank moved for summary judgment and alleged it was a
professional health care provider under Delaware law.'Defendant
alleged since it was a professional health care provider, expert
testimony during discovery was needed to prove its liability. 4 1 Since
no expert testimony existed to prove Blood Bank's failure to adhere to
the appropriate standard of care, it asserted its entitlement to summary
judgment. 44 Blood Bank also stated the transfusion was through the
services of a physician, thus
Blood Bank's failure to warn was not a
145
liability.
for
reason
viable
The lower court refuted these arguments, and held Blood Bank
was not a health care provider as defined under Delaware law making
expert medical testimony unnecessary. 14 ' The lower court also ruled a
dispute of material fact existed as to whether the treating physician
knew of the risk of HIV48 transmission through the blood transfusions. 4 7
Blood Bank appealed.1
The Supreme Court of Delaware agreed with the lower court and
affirmed Blood Bank was not a health care provider.14 " The court did
not rule on whether plaintiff could recover at trial without expert
medical testimony on the standard of care.'s" The court stated it did not
agree the standard of care should be evaluated as to a reasonable
person's "exercise of his or her common sense."' l 51 However, the court
agreed with the lower court that the learned intermediary doctrine did
not relieve Blood Bank from liability since the limited knowledge
accompanying the risk of HIV transmission in 1984 made it unrealistic
141See id
42

1 See id
43

1 Price, 2000 Del. LEXIS 81, at *2.
44See id at *2.
145See id
146See id. at *3.
47

1 See id.
I4SPrice,

2000 Del. LEXIS 81, at *3.

149See id
0
'5
See id
151See id
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to assume the treating physician knew any more regarding the
transmission of HIV than did Blood Bank. 152 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the denial of summary judgment. 153 Blood Bank of Delaware
v. Price,No. 133,1999, 2000 Del. Lexis 81 (Del. Feb. 28, 2000).

Physician's Sheer Presence in Delivery Room Insufficient to Create
a Physician-Patient Relationship and Thus No Duty Is Owed
The Court of Appeals of Texas held a physician who is simply present
in the delivery room has not established a physician-patient
relationship; therefore, no duty is owed to the patient. 154
Plaintiff mother, while twenty-five weeks pregnant, was involved
in an automobile accident. 155 She was admitted to the hospital two
days after the accident because of complications with her pregnancy,
and an emergency cesarean section was subsequently performed one
month later. 5 6 During the cesarean delivery, the infant suffered severe
brain damage and neurological deficits. 157 Defendant physician was
present in the delivery room during the emergency cesarean section. 158
Plaintiff and her husband sued individually and on behalf of their
159
son.
They alleged defendant physician was the supervising
physician for the residents who performed cesarean deliveries in the
delivery room. 160 They further claimed defendant physician acted
negligently in his supervision of the resident physicians. 16f
Defendant physician filed both a traditional and a no evidence
motion for summary judgment, stating he owed no duty to plaintiff, and
if he did, he neither breached his duty nor was the proximate cause of
52

See id. at *34.

15 3Price, 2000 Del. LEXIS 81, at *4.
154Reynosa v. Huff, No. 04-99-00701-CV,

2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532 (Tex.

Ct. App. Apr.
19, 2000).
...
See id. at *3.
ssee
id.
157See id.
5
1 1See id.
159Reynosa, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532, at *3.
160See id.
161See id.
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the infant's injuries. 162 The trial court granted defendant's motion for
summary judgment. 163 Plaintiff and her husband appealed. 1"
A duty to act in regards to a patient is established by a physicianpatient relationship.1 65 This relationship only exists upon a physician's
express or implied consent. 16 6 When no prior relationship exists
between patient and physician, the physician must take an affirmative
step to treat the patient before a relationship is created." 7 The trial
court held the responsibility of being6 "on call" at a hospital did not
create a physician-patient relationship. S
The court of appeals reasoned appellee physician's mere presence
in the delivery room was inadequate to create a physician-patient
relationship. 69 Physician presented evidence he never gave advise
about appellant, never spoke with her, or even saw her while in the
delivery room.1 70 However, appellant and her husband claimed, even if
appellee physician had no contact with plaintiff, he owed a duty based
on the University of Texas Health Science Center's by-laws and his
sheer presence in the delivery unit.17 1 They cited expert testimony an
attending physician is responsible for supervising the resident
physicians and the patient's care in a unit, and contended appellee
physician took over the role of attending physician when he entered the
delivery room. 172 The court, however, agreed with the lower court's
reasoning appellee physician was assigned to specific patients and
appellant was not one of them. 73 They found the physician did not
have a duty
to appellant based on the Health Science Center's
74
Bylaws. 1

162See id
' 6'See id at *3.

164Reynosa,
2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532, at *3.
65
1 See id
66
see id
67

1 See id at *3

16SSee id. at *4.

169Rcynosa, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532, at *4.
I'°See id
17 1See id. at *4.
'72See id
"See id. at *5.

174Reynosa, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 2532, at *5.
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Finding no evidence existed to establish a physician-patient
relationship, and no subsequent duty owed by physician to appellant,
the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's order for summary
judgment in favor of physician.' 75 Reynosa v. Huff 2000 Tex. App.
LEXIS 2532 (Tex. Ct. App., Apr. 19, 2000)

Although Physician-Patient Relationship Did Not Exist When
Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier Hired Physician to
Perform Exam, Physician Still Had Duty Not to Cause Injury
The Court of Appeals of Texas held when a physician is hired by third
party to examine a patient a physician-patient relationship does not
exist, thus the physician only owes the non-patient a duty not to cause
76
injury.'
Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim and was examined
by defendant physician who had been hired by the worker's
compensation insurance carrier to determine an impairment rating of
patient's injury. 177 Plaintiff claimed he was injured by defendant
physician during the examination. 7 8 Plaintiff subsequently sued
physician alleging, inter alia, medical negligence and common law
79
negligence. 1
In his own deposition testimony, plaintiff alleged the physician
pushed on his back forcing plaintiff to move further than he was able
to.18° Plaintiff also presented expert testimony explaining how his
spinal fusion, which had been healing properly before he was examined
by defendant physician, had bled into his muscles "probably secondary
to the range of motion testing."' 8 1 The trial court granted summary
82
judgment to the physician on the medical negligence claims.
175See id.
7

7'Ramirez v. Carreras, 10 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2000).

177See id.at

178See id.
79

760.

1 See id.

'SSee id.at 763.

"12Ramirez, 10 S.W.3d, at 763.
1 See id.at 760.
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Plaintiff appealed 83the summary judgment as to his common law
negligence claim.1
The appellate court reasoned that no relationship existed between
patient and physician because physician was requested by a third party,
the workers' compensation insurance carrier, to examine patient. '
After the court found no physician-patient relationship existed, the
claim of medical negligence could not exist since a physician could not
be professionally negligent to a non-patient. l 5 However, the court
further reasoned even in a situation where no physician-patient
relationship existed, a physician is required to examine the non-patient
in such a way as to not cause injury./s6 Additionally, the court found
plaintiff had presented some evidence of possible injury suffered during
the examination, hence his claim was sufficient to survive a noevidence challenge. 8 7 Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the
medical negligence summary judgment, but remanded the case to the
lower court for re-trial on the common law negligence claim consistent
with its opinion. 88 Ramirez v. Carreras,10 S.IW.3d 757, 7'60, 2J0
Tex. App. LEXIS 200 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 2000).

When Consulting Physician Does Not Provide Continuity of
Care to Patient, the Statute of Limitations Starts Tolling
on the Date the Patient First Sees the Physician
The Court of Appeals of Texas held appellant patient's claim was
barred by a two hundred and seventy-five day statute of limitations and
physician did not breach the standard of care when he evaluated patient
on May 30, 1995."9

IS3See id
' See id. at 762.
ISSee id.
"6Rairez, 10 S.W.3d, at 762.
SSee id. at 763.
ISSSee id at 764.
1 9
S \Vison v. Korthauer, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3303 (Tex. Ct. App, May
2000).

11",
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On December 14, 1994, plaintiff injured her wrist when she fell
off a stool at a physician's office. 190 On December 15, 1994 patient
was evaluated by her primary care physician who diagnosed her as
having a fracture; placed her wrist in a volar splint; and referred her to
defendant orthopedic specialist as required by her HMO. 191 The
orthopedist examined patient on December 15, 1994, and reviewed her
accompanying x-rays from her primary care physician. 192 Defendant
diagnosed patient as having a Colles fracture of the distal radius and
recommended she wear the volar splint and have the wrist x-rayed by
her primary care physician
every two weeks until expected healing in
93
four to six weeks. 1
Patient continued to see her primary care physician every two
weeks for follow-up care, until her fracture was reported as healed on
February 8, 1995.114 On May 30, 1995, patient was sent back to the
orthopedist for re-evaluation of her wrist because she was unable to use
it as well as she had before the fracture in 1994.'9' The defendant
orthopedist diagnosed patient as having an ulnar styloid fracture which,
as is usual, had not healed and had caused some impaction and
shortening of the bone at the Colles fracture site. 19 6 Defendant
recommended physical therapy as follow up treatment for patient to
197
improve the range of motion of the left wrist.
On February 18, 1997, patient sued the physician in whose office
she had fallen, and joined the orthopedist as a defendant on April 13,
1997, claiming his negligence had resulted in deformity of her left
98
upper extremity. 1
The trial court granted the orthopedist's motion for summary
judgment holding plaintiffs claims were barred by the statute of
limitations. 199 Plaintiff subsequently appealed. 200 The court reasoned
9

°See id. at

9

1See id.
at *2.

*1.

92

1 See id.

193 See

id.

19 Wilson, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *2-3.
'9See id. at *3.
'"See id.
19 7See id.

'"See id. at *34.

'"Wilson, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *5.
See id. at *7.

200
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patient was referred to the orthopedist on December 15, 1994 for a one
time consultation visit; therefore, the required physician-patient
relationship was not established. 20 ' Furthermore, the orthopedist did
not require patient to have follow-up treatments with him since she did
not require further services from him.202 In fact, patient's primary care
physician's referral on May 30, 1995 was for an orthopedic consult for
a condition different from that of December 15, 1994. - 3
The court of appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding the patient was not receiving ongoing care from the
orthopedist, hence, the two year seventy-five day statute of limitations
had expired as to the December 15, 1994 visit and barred patient's
claim. 204 Wilson v. Korthauer, 2000 Tex. App. LEVIS 3303 ( Tex. .
App. May 18, 2000).

REIMBURSEMENT
Clinical Laboratory Testing Companies Do Not Fall
Within Medicare Part B Provisions
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, held a clinical laboratory testing company does not
fall under the meaning of the Medicare
Part B provisions; therefore,
2
there is no subject-matter jurisdiction. 05
Quest is a large clinical laboratory testing company offering a
wide range of services used in detection, diagnosis, evaluation,
monitoring, and treatment of diseases. Plaintiffs late wife had testing
done by Quest and was billed directly $70.20 for these senices.2
United Healthcare, on behalf of the federal government,
determined the approved charge was only $2 9 .5 3 .2"7 Since plaintiff
20

See id at *21.
See id. at *20.
20 3
- See id.at *21.
202

204

2

Wilson, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS, at *22.
CIernons v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 99-C-6122, 2000 U.S, Dibt. LEXIS

7S66 (E.D.
II1.June 5, 2000).
20 6
See id at *3.
207
See id at *2.

DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW[

[Vol. 4-223

was billed directly for the services rendered, Medicare never received
the bills. 208 Plaintiff paid the amount billed in order to preserve his
credit.20 9 Plaintiff subsequently brought a claim in his own right, and
also a class action on behalf of all persons in the Medicare Part B
program who had been billed by Quest for amounts in excess of those
allowed by the Medicare Part B program.210
Quest motioned to dismiss on two grounds.2 1' First, Quest stated
the lower court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the
Medicare Act violation as described in plaintiffs complaint, since 2no
12
private right to action existed under the Medicare Act provision.
Quest further contended the court should not hear the other claims
213
alleged by plaintiff because of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The court reasoned Quest did not fall within the meaning of Part
B of the Medicare Act since the subsections did not refer to companies
such as Quest.2 14 Furthermore, the court contended Quest did not fit
the meaning of "incident to" because Quest did not meet the two
requirements necessary to fall within this category. 211* Accordingly, the
court dismissed the plaintiffs claims holding Quest did not fall within
the meaning of the Medicare Act, therefore, the court lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction. 216 Clemons v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., No. 99 C
6122, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7866 (E.D. 11. June 5, 2000).

2 8

° See id.
See id.

20 9

2 10
21

Clemons, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7866, at *4.

'See id.

2 12

See id.
id.
See id at *5.
21
Clemons, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7866, at *6.
216
See id. at *8.
213
See
214
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Medicare Statute Does Not Control Reimbursement
Rates For Medigap Policies
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held Vencor, a provider of long-term hospital care, could 2charge
its
17
policies.
Medigap
for
services
of
reimbursement
for
own rate
Physicians Mutual sued Vencor, claiming the Medicare Act
required services under the Medigap policies to be charged at the rate
approved by Medicare. 21 S The district court granted Physicians
Mutual's motion for summary judgment, stating Physicians Mutual had
reimbursed Vencor at the maximum rate listed for Medicare covered
hospital days.21 9 Vencor appealed.22 °
Physicians Mutual supported their claim Vencor was required to
follow the Medicare Act's reimbursement requirements by pointing to
the Medicare statute and a "Model Regulation" written by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).2'
The court
disagreed with the lower court, finding the Medicare statute and the
"Model Regulation" lacking in support for Physicians Mutual's
argument. 22 2 The court stated the Medicare statute and "Model
Regulation" did not specify specifically reimbursement for hospital
2
days. 21
not be
In addition, the court contended such a meaning could
implied from the general purpose of the statute.224 The court stated the
Supreme Court had instructed "broad purposes of legislation at the
expense of specific provisions" should be avoided.22 Since no statute
or regulation supported Physician Mutual's argument, the court held
Vencor was not required to reimburse according to the rate adopted by
217

Vencor, Inc. v. Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., No. 99-7039, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS2 1811397 (D.C. Cir. May 23,2000).
See id at *3.
21
id. at *2.
229See
0
See id.
2-'See id. at *4.
2Vencor,
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 11397, at *4.
-'See id
4
2 See id at *4-5.
2See id
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Medicare, but instead allowed to charge its own rate. 226 The court
227
reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded the case.
Vencor, Inc. v. PhysiciansMut. Ins. Co., No. 99-7089, 2000 U.S. App.
Lexis 11397 (D.C Cir.May 23, 2000).

Physicians Are Not Entitled to Additional Payment
Fee If Reimbursement For Multiple Procedures Is
Improperly Applied Under Medicare
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held physicians are not entitled to additional payments if there was an
improper application
of the multiple procedure reimbursement amounts
228
under Medicare.
The plaintiffs' claims arose from miscalculation of the multiple
procedure reimbursement rule, and the rule's application under the
Medicare Program. 229 The defendant, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services, determines the final reimbursement rates. 230 Usually
patients are reimbursed 80% of the approved physician's charge and
are responsible for paying the remaining 20%.23 1
The plaintiff physicians in this case became non-assignee
physicians. 232 Non-assignee physicians receive all payments directly
from the patients and the patients are then reimbursed directly from
Medicare.
Though the physician does not receive his payment
directly from Medicare, the physician is still bound by statutory
restrictions on what she can charge the patient. 234 Usually the nonassignee physician can charge the Medicare approved amount plus an

226

See

id.at *9.

227
Vencor, 2000
22

U.S. App. LEXIS 11397, at *9.
SFurlong v. Shalala, No. 94 Civ. 4817,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1609 (S.D.N.Y

Feb. 18,
2292000).
See id.
230

See id. at *2.
See id. at *3.
23 2
231

See id. at *4.
Furlong,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1609, at *3.
234See id. at *4.
233
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additional charge capped by statutory regulations. 23 5 The Medicare
Carrier Manual provides for "one-and-one-half' rule for reimbursement
2
of multiple surgical procedures performed during the same operation. "
The amount of reimbursement is determined by adding the Medicare
approved charges for one procedure with one-half of the
approved
7
charges for the other procedure during the same operation.
The non-assignee physicians in this case were anesthesiologists
who performed simultaneous invasive procedures on patients
undergoing surgery.238 These procedures allowed the physicians to
monitor the patients' bodily functions concurrently.23" The patients'
Medicare carriers applied the one-and-one-half rule to the invasive
monitoring procedures performed by the anesthesiologists.2 '4 Because
the rules of payment for these services are limited for non-assignee
physicians, the amount the physicians were entitled to charge the
patients was less than if the one-and-one-half rule had not been
applied.24 '
The physicians claimed the Medicare carriers
inappropriately applied the one-and-one-half rule to the concurrent
invasive monitoring procedures and violated their Due Process
rights. 242 Furthermore the physicians claimed the defendant acted
"arbitrarily and capriciously," not within the law, and2 3abused its
judgment in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. 1
Both the plaintiffs and defendant filed motions for summary
judgment.
The court granted summary judgment to the defendant,
applying the one-and-one-half rule and holding the plaintiffs xverQ not
completely deprived of payment for their services. 245 Furhmg n
Shalala,No. 94 Cih. 4817, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEVIS 161) ,SDX.. YFeh.
18, 2000).
2 5See id.
2376See id. at *6.
3 See id.
"'SFurlong,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1609, at *4,
r2409See id at *6.
See id. at *7.
24 1

242
24

ee id.

See id.

3Furlong,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1609, at *7.

244
See
24 5

id. at *8.
See id
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Because Use of Phrase "Medical Eligible Expenses" Referred to
Costs and Not Solely Types of Treatment Only a Percentage of the
Discounted Medicare Rate Could Be Reimbursed
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, but held
evidentiary hearing on issue of accord and satisfaction as to plaintiff's
claim regarding individual insured.246
Plaintiff Vencor Hospital claimed it was entitled to standard rate
for treatment of defendant Blue Cross-Blue Shield's (BCBS) insureds,
rather than the discounted Medicare reimbursement rate claimed by
defendant. 247
Plaintiff provides long-term inpatient care, while
defendant issues Medicare
supplement insurance policies, also kmown
248
policies.
as Medigap
Two holders of BCBS Medigap policies were patients at Vencor
hospital when their Medicare coverage expired, forcing them to rely on
Medigap policies to cover their hospital expenses. 249 Since BCBS only
paid plaintiff hospital the amount Medicare would have paid for the
services provided, plaintiff hospital (claiming it was entitled to collect
standard rates from BCBS) filed suit alleging breach of contract,
subrogation, and promissory estoppel. °
The court of appeals reviewed several issues, including the
contract terms, and found the plain and ordinary meaning of the term
"health care expenses" referred to the costs of expenses, as BCBS
suggested.2 5' The court did not find a definition of the word "expense"
as a service, as Vencor suggested. 2 The court found the insureds were
required to pay only a 10% co-payment (required by Medigap policy)
25 3
and Vencor was therefore only owed 90% of the eligible expenses.
246

Vencor Hospital Fort Lauderdale v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Rhode
Island,242000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2921 (S.D.FL. 2000).
7
See id. at * 1.
See id. at *3.
249
See id.
248

2'SSee id. at *4.
251Vencor, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2921, at *7-9.
2'2See id. at *9.
253See id. at * 11.
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The court found the promissory estoppel claim went only to the types
of treatment because plaintiffs failed to allege anything about
statements regarding costs of treatment by BCBS, and only alleged
BCBS acknowledged the proposed treatment was co,.ered.R4
Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant
Blue Cross-Blue Shield on all counts. 2 -"
ncor Hsptitl Fort
Lauderdale v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Rhode Island, 86 FSzpp.2d
1155 (S.D.Fl. 2000).

Patient Not Entitled to Double Recovery For Medical Expenses
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held appellant's insurer was
liable for an award
from a second jury, or for the sumr due appellee after
2 56
remittitur.
a
Appellee's medical expenses were stipulated and awarded in her
favor based on a medical malpractice claim. 2
Appellant claimed
damages were excessive, and pursuant to Maryland Code Annotated,
Courts & Judicial Procedure (CJP) § 3-2A-06(f), prayed for a reduction
by motion for remittitur.2 58 Issues of collateral source and subrogation
were central.259
The trial court determined Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Maryland (BCBSM) had paid appellee's expenses and retained
subrogation lien 26
against a judgment entered in the same amount in
favor of appellee. U
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed with appellant's belief
that after evidence had been received indicating opposing party had or
would be paid under insurance, statute, or contract, the trial court had to
declare damages were excessive. 261 The court held according to the
2 4See id at *13.

255See id. at *14.
256Narayen v. Bailey, 2000 Md. App. LEXIS 31 (Md. Ct. Spce, App. Mar, 2,

2000).

2-7 See id

at *5.
SSee id. at *6.
9
25
26 0See id at *5.
See id
26
Narayen, 2000 Md. App. LEXIS, at *7.
2
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legislative history of CJP § 3-2A-06, recovery for damages that had
been or would be paid under benefit plans was merely a ground for
modification of an alleged excessive award.262
According to § 3-2A-06, collateral source evidence is permitted in
post-verdict proceedings in medical malpractice actions, and the
reduction of damages is left to the judge or jury.263 The trial court
misinterpreted §3-2A-06, leaving the issue of whether or not the
indemnification language in the section was clear. 264 Due to the
subrogation, the payment of the medical bills by BCBSM did not
represent indemnification. 2 65 Even though BCBSM did not indemnify
appellee, appellee continued to be liable to BCBSM. 266 Therefore,
rather than appellee remitting award to BCBSM, appellant's insurer
was responsible for either an award from a second jury, or the sum due
appellee after a remittitur.267 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial
court was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City. 268 Narayen v. Bailey, 130 Md App. 458, 2000 Md.
App. LEXIS 31 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Mar. 2, 2000).

Regardless of Medical Necessity Medicare Part B Does
Not Reimburse For Outpatient Teeth Extraction
The United District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held
Medicare Part B does not reimburse for outpatient extraction of teeth,
269
even when medically necessary to prepare for surgery.
In May 1994, plaintiff was enrolled in Medicare Parts A and B
when his cardiologist determined he needed his aortic heart valve
replaced.27 ° In preparation for the cardiac procedure, the cardiologist
262

See

263

id. at *8.

See id. at * 11.
26'See id. at * 12.
26 5
See id. at *13.
26Narayen, 130 Md.App 458 at *13.
26 7
26

See

id.

See id. at *14.
26 9
Wood v. Shalala, 94 F.Supp.2d 1024 (W.D. Wis. May 3,2000).
270
See id. at 1025.
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ordered patient to have total dental extraction to prevent his periodontal
putting the new heart valve at risk for bacterial
disease from
2 71
infection.

In June 1994, a dentist removed seventeen of plaintiffs diseased
teeth in an outpatient setting.2 72 The dentist subsequently submitted a
In July
claim for payment from patient's Medicare Part B carrier.!
1994, Medicare denied reimbursement for the teeth extractions stating
it did not pay for dental care. 274 Patient appealed the decision three
times but was unsuccessful. 275 The Secretary of the Department of
Health and Social Services (Secretary) denied plaintiffs request lbr
review in October of 1999 and he filed suit to have the Secretary's
decision reviewed. z76
The district court stated Medicare Part B was part of the federal
health insurance program for people over sixty-five and while it
provided reimbursements for reasonable and necessary services it did
not cover the removal of teeth.277 Medicare Part A which covers
inpatient hospital care, skilled nursing facility, home health and hospice
care services would have covered plaintiffs teeth extraction since the
medical condition made his teeth extraction
severity of his underlying
27
medically necessary. S
The court therefore affirmed the Secretary's denial of
reimbursement under Medicare Part B, holding plaintiff was not
entitled to reimbursement for the outpatient extraction of his teeth even
though medically necessary to prepare for his heart valve
replacement. 2 79 Wood v. Shalala, 94 F.Supp.2d 1024. 20110 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 7030 (WJ.D. Wis. May 3, 2000).

271

See id.
272See id
27
3See id
2741Wood, 94
27
5See id.
276
see id.
277See id
27

See id

F.Supp.2d at 1025.

at 1025-1026.

279 Wood, 94

F.Supp.2d, at 1025.
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STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Prescription Exception to the Louisiana Medical Malpractice
Act Bars Recovery of Claim Filed More Than Three Years After
the Event On Which the Claim Is Based
The Court of Appeal of Louisiana held the prescription exception to the
Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act bars recovery on claim280filed more
than three years after the event on which the claim is based.
Plaintiff received a blood transfusion in 1979 at Hotel Dieu
Hospital and was diagnosed with the Hepatitis C Virus eighteen years
later.28 ' Plaintiff filed suit on June 17, 1998, one year after her
diagnosis, against Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent DePaul, Inc. and
Hotel Dieu Hospital. 282 The trial court granted the defendants
exception of prescription on January 22, 1999 and plaintiff
subsequently appealed. 8 3 The court of appeals held strict liability did
not apply to plaintiffs claim, but rather the Louisiana Medical
Malpractice Act (Act) applied since the Act covered all legal
responsibility, 2and
her claim was barred by the period of prescription
84
within the Act.
The court reasoned part of the Act governed the period of
prescription and required all claims to be filed within a period of three
years from the date of the alleged act, omission, or neglect even if filing
occurred within one year from the date of discovery.2852S6 Patient filed
her claim nineteen years after the date of the alleged act.
The court affirmed the lower court, but was troubled by the
unfairness of the period of prescription to persons such as plaintiff, and
respectfully requested the legislature to consider the issue. 287 Liner v.
28OLiner v. Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent DePaul, 753 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct.
App. Feb.
281 16, 2000).
See id. at 336-337.
282
See id. at 337.
283
See id.
28
4

See id.

2
"SLiner,753
236

See id.

28 7

See id.

So.2d, at 337.
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Daughters of Charity of St. Vincent DePaul.753 So. 2d 336, 2000 La.
App. LEXIS 247 (La. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2000).

TORTS
Blood Purchased and Used For Ordinary Purpose Does
Not Satisfy an Element of Breach Of Implied Warranty
Claim of Fitness For a Particular Purpose
The Court of Appeals of Missouri held the trial court erred in denying
defendant's motions for directed verdict and judgment notvithstanding
the verdict for wrongful death action, and ordered the case to be
transferred to the2 Missouri Supreme Court because it dealt vith areas of
first impression. SS
In 1983 and 1984, plaintiff purchased factor concentrate, from
defendant,
which
was
contaminated
with
the
Human
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and ultimately led to the death of her
son.2 89 Plaintiff brought claims of wrongful death and negligence,
alleging defendant was liable for selling factor concentrate
in 1983 and
1
1984 without warning of the risk of HIV contamination.2 4)
The trial court ruled in plaintiffs favor and defendant appealed. 2"'
After considering the language of Missouri's statutory provisions for
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and implied
warranty of merchantability plus other case law with similar provisions.
the court of appeals concluded plaintiff did not have enough evidence
to establish the product was bought for a purpose special or -particular"
and distinct from the ordinary purpose. 292 The fact the factor
concentrate had only one purpose did not satisfy the "special purpose"
element of the claim.293
2

SsDoe v. Miles Incorporated, No. ED75100,2000 Mo. App. LEXIS 770 (Mlu,

Ct. App.
2 May 23, 2000).
SSee id. at * 7.
290See id.
291
See id at * l.
292
See id at *14.
293
Doe, 2000 Mo. Ct. App. LEXIS 770, at * 15.
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Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the ruling of the trial
court, holding plaintiff failed to prove a use peculiar to the buyer's
business and different from the ordinary purpose, which was to provide
a missing blood clotting factor.294 Because the case dealt with implied
warranty and application of the Missouri Blood Shield Statute, which
are areas of first impression, the court ordered the case be transferred to
the Missouri Supreme Court. 295 Doe v. Miles Incorporated, No.
ED75100, 2000 Mo. App. LEXIS 770 (Mo. Ct. App. May 23, 2000).

Physician's Unauthorized Disclosure of Confidential
Information Is Considered a Tort and Plaintiff Could Be
Entitled to Damages For Emotional Distress
The Court of Appeals of Washington held tort action existed from
unauthorized disclosure of confidential health care information
obtained within a physician-patient relationship, 296
and plaintiff was
distress.
emotional
for
including
entitled to damages,
Plaintiff was examined by a vascular surgeon on July 1, 1993.2")7
During this initial examination, the vascular surgeon obtained
plaintiffs medical, personal, and social history. 298 He learned of
plaintiffs prior medical problems, including the fact she had taken a
narcotic medication called Tylox (R.) in the past.2 99 The surgeon also
30 °
learned of her new husband and two children from a prior marriage. 0
Plaintiff stated her ex-husband was a physician and their relationship
was extremely strained. 30'
Defendant surgeon obtained written
permission from plaintiff to obtain her medical records from the
University of Michigan Hospital where multiple surgical procedures

294

See id. at * 15.
See id. at *24.

295

296Berger

v. Sonneland, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 899 (Wash. Ct. App. June 13,

2000).297

See id. at *2.
See id. at *2-3.
299
See id.
30 0
See id.
30
298

'Berger, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS, at *2.
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had been performed on her.30 2 Nothing in the record reflected patient's
ex-husband was at any time her medical provider or had provided her
with any prescriptions. 30 3 Defendant surgeon was not given permission
to contact plaintiff s ex-husband."
Directly after seeing plaintiff, defendant surgeon contactud
plaintiff's ex-husband, informing him of her use of the narcotic pain
medicine Tylox (R.). 3u5 Subsequent to this conversation, plaintiff's exhusband sought to modify the custody order governing their two
children, claiming plaintiff had abused narcotic pain medicine and
Tylox (R.) was her "drug of choice. '30 , Plaintiffs ex-husband asked
the court to waive the physician-patient relationship so defendant could
be deposed concerning
plaintiffs alleged request for Tylo (R.) from
30 7
surgeon.
defendant
emotional1l"
Plaintiff sued claiming negligent inflition
distress. 30s The trial court held plaintiff failed to e,,tablish through
objective medical testimony her objective symptonm of enotikonal
distress, and plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals reasoned a tort action existed fr damages
resulting from the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information
related to health care obtained within a physician-patient
relationship. 30 9 The court reasoned for patient to prevail she had to
establish defendant surgeon violated the standard of care he o ,tedto
her as a patient. 310 The court also recognized invasion of confidenceaS
an independent tort action. 3 ' The court noted the societal ihtere t in
protecting the physician-patient relationship and the conlidential
information disclosed within that relationship. 12 The court noted if a
physician disclosed information without authority a patient's security
interest within the confidential relationship and expectation of secrecy
302See id at *2-3
3°3See
id. at *3.
3 4
See id.
'0 5See id.
306Berger,2000 Wash.App. LEXIS.
"0 7See id at *4.

at *4.

-""See id. at *6-7.
'MSee id at *28.
'"1See id.

7'"Berger,
2000 Wash.App. LEXIS, at *25.
2
1 See id.
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would be destroyed.3 13 Furthermore, if a physician disclosed
information without authority, then a patient's specific interest in
avoiding circulation of that information would be violated."14 The
court found "a patient seeking damages for a physician's unauthorized
disclosure of confidential information related to health care should be
entitled to those damages necessary to compensate the patient for the
harm caused by the physician's disclosure." 31 5 The court of appeals
reasoned plaintiff had a cause of action against defendant surgeon with
sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact as to whether plaintiff was
injured by defendant surgeon's disclosure. 3 16 Accordingly, the court of
appeals reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for
re-trial.3 17 Berger v. Sonneland, 2000 Wash. App. LEXIS 899 (Wash.
Ct. App. June 13, 2000).

WRONGFUL BIRTH
Decision to Intentionally Conceive Child With Known
Birth Risks Reduces Damages But Does Not Bar Recovery
For Wrongful Birth and Malpractice
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held intentional conception of a
child with foreseeable risk of birth defects does not fully relieve the
physician of liability, but does reduce the amount of damages
allowed.318
On January 11, 1987, plaintiff mother gave birth to a child with
significant birth defects caused by erythroblastosis fetalis, a condition
of the fetus where maternal and fetal blood Rh factors are
incompatible. 31 9 Plaintiff parents claimed wrongful birth on their
behalf and wrongful life on the child's behalf because delendant
3 13

See id.

3 14

See id.

3 15

316See id. at *26.
Berger, 2000 Wash.App.
3 7

LEXIS, at *29.
See id.
3
v. Scheininger, 162 N.J. 209 (N.J. Jan. 25, 2000).
311sLynch
9
See id. at 214.
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physician allegedly failed to inform them of the risks of future
pregnancy, and defendant physician's alleged malpractice
during a
32
0
impairments.
severe
to
led
had
previous pregnancy
The trial court dismissed the wrongful birth claim stating it was
barred by the two-year statute of limtations. 3 1 The wrongful life
claim was also dismissed by the trial court because of lack of evidence
plaintiffs followed defendant's advice when deciding to conceive a
child.3 22 The trial court found plaintiffs' intentional conception of the
child with knowledge
of the risks was a supervening cause that barred
323
recovery.
Plaintiffs appealed, but the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the wrongful birth claim. 324 The court, however,
reversed the decision of the trial court against the child's negligence
claim, contending the parents voluntary decision to conceive was not a
supervening cause of the child's disabilities. 325 It was reasonably
foreseeable a married couple would attempt to conceive even though a
physician's previous malpractice during another
pregnancy increased
326
children.
future
in
the risk of abnormalities
The case was heard by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which
affirmed the appellate division's judgment, holding the presence of
foreseeable intervening causes did not relieve defendant physician of
liability. 327 The court stated a tortfeasor is generally liable for injuries
resulting in the ordinary course of events from his negligence, and
found it sufficient if the negligent conduct was a substantial factor in
the injury.
The court found no basis for concluding
plaintiffs'
2
3 )
cause.
intervening
an
constituted
conceive
to
decision
The court reasoned retrial was necessary to elicit the proofs
concerning the warnings given to plaintiffs by defendant concerning
32 0

See id

321See id
3
2See id.

32Lynch, 162 N.J. 209, at 235.
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future pregnancies. 330 Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the matter to the Law
Division for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.331 Lynch
v. Scheininger, 162 NJ 209, 2000 N.J. LEXIS 10 (N.J.Jan. 25, 2000).

33
33°See
1

id.
See id.at 240.

